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Abstract
Game theory is an established branch of mathematics that offers a rich set of mathematical
tools for multi-person strategic decision making that can be used to model the interactions
of decision makers in security problems who compete for limited and shared resources. This
article presents a review of the literature in the area of game theoretical modelling of net-
work/cybersecurity.
1 Introduction
For most physical security situations the outcomes depend on the actions of both attackers and
defenders. The attackers and defenders act rationally and can depend on various incentives that
may be diametrically opposite or, under other circumstances, may have some overlap. Physical
security thus provides the situations where the tools of game theory can be beneficially applied
and can provide insights into making optimal security decisions. For various decision-making
problems arising in physical security, game theory can provide a rich set of analytical methods
and mathematical tools.
The pervasive use of the Internet opens up numerous network security situations. The attackers
and defenders in typical situations are rational agents who have the ability to act strategically.
The agents can be assumed to be interested in finding either the most damaging or the most secure
use of available resources. In the domain of network security, game theory has been shown [1,2] to
provide useful insights in making decisions that lead to developing novel, analytic, computational,
and practical approaches in the thought, policy, planning, and strategic action. Game theory
provides methodical approaches in order to explain the inter-dependencies of the role of hidden and
asymmetric information in networks, network security decisions [3,4], the incentives/limitations of
the attackers, the perception of risks and costs in human behavior, and much more. The elegant
and powerful tools made available by game theory are found to be highly useful in order to build
secure, resilient, and dependable networked systems [5, 6].
2 Game theory
Game theory [7–13] is an established branch of mathematics that develops mathematical models,
allowing rigorous analysis, of strategic interaction between rational decision-makers. It studies
complex, competitive, and multi-agent interactions in which one player’s utility depends not only
on his decisions, but also on the decisions of his opponents. Game theory is applied to a number
of disciplines, including economics [14, 15], biology [16–18], political science [19, 20], electrical
engineering [23, 24], business [25, 26], computer science [21, 22], law [27, 28], public policy [29],
physical security [30,31], mechanism design [32–34], and more recently to the quantum information
[35–38]. Game theory can enable opponents to predict each other’s rational behavior and suggest
a course of action to be taken in any given situation.
2.1 Static and dynamic games
Games considered in the field of game theory are broadly classified as being the static or dynamic
games [10,11]. In static games the players choose their strategies simultaneously whereas dynamic
games involve a sequence of moves. In dynamic games [39, 40], a player chooses before others do,
knowing that the others’ choices will be influenced by his/her publicly observable choice. The dy-
namic character of the game results in models that can enhance the learning ability of the players.
In turn, this learning can help security practitioners to develop high quality theoretical studies on
real-life problems. Depending on a particular situation in cybersecurity that are amenable to game
theoretical analyses, applying either static or dynamic game theory can considered appropriate.
For instance, a cybersecurity situation involving a team of attackers and a plan of attack in which
the attackers act simultaneously, the application of static game theory will be required. Whereas,
dynamic game theory will be applied when some of the attackers act first and the reaction of the
defenders is observed before the remaining attackers act while equipped with the knowledge of
how the defenders have reacted.
2.2 Nash equilibrium
The rule for predicting how a game will be played defines the solution concepts in terms of which
the game is understood by game theorists. The most commonly used solution concept in game
theory is that of a Nash equilibrium (NE). Assume there are N players in a game. Let Si and Ui
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N be the strategy spaces and the payoff, or utility, for each player i, respectively. The
individual elements of the strategy space Si for player i are called the pure strategies. The game
can then be described [41] by the set G :
G : {N ;S1, S2, ...SN ;U1, U2, ...UN} . (1)
The presumable outcome of the game is determined by analyzing the behaviour of the players and
their strategy choices. Let s = {s1, s2, ...sN} be the profile of pure strategies with si ∈ Si. Let
s−1 be the profile of strategies excluding player i. A strategy profile s with s = (si; s−i) for all i,
is a NE [7, 10, 13, 43, 44] such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N we have
Ui(s) ≥ Ui(t; s−i) for all t ∈ Si. (2)
This is also described by stating that the strategy of each player i is a best reply [7, 10, 13] to the
strategies of other players. In the cybersecurity context, the defenders’ strategy profile that is a
NE will consist of a set of defensive strategies, one on the behalf of each defender, such that the
strategy of each defender is a best reply to the strategies of the attackers.
2.2.1 Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
A mixed strategy [13] is a linear combination, with real coefficients, of two or more pure strategies,
with their probability weights summing up to 1. This defines the probability distribution pii =
(pii,t)t∈Si for player i choosing randomly among the pure strategies Si. The expected payoff for
the player i is then given [41] by
U¯i(s1, s2, ...sN ) =
N∑
j=1
∑
sj∈Sj
Ui(s1, s2, ...sN )Π
N
k=1pik,sk . (3)
A set of probability distributions pii = (pii)1≤i≤N defines a mixed NE, or a NE in mixed strategies,
such that for all i and any other probability distribution p¯ii = (pii,t)t∈Si we have
N∑
j=1
∑
sj∈Sj
Ui(s1, s2, ...sN )Π
N
k=1pik,sk ≥
∑
t∈Si
∑
j 6=i
∑
sj∈Sj
Ui(t; s−i)p¯ii,tΠk 6=ipik,sk . (4)
A key result of Nash’s thesis [43,44] states that a NE always exists in mixed (randomized) strategies
in games where each player has only a finite number of deterministic strategies. In a NE, no one
player can improve his/her situation by unilaterally changing his/her strategy. This amounts to
stating that each person is doing as well as they possibly can, even if that does not mean that an
optimal outcome has been achieved for the collective of all players. In a cyber attack when a NE
is determined for a team of defenders, neither is left with any motivation to deviate unilaterally
from it.
2.2.2 Prisoners’ Dilemma
The game of Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) [7,10,13] describes the following situation: a) Two crimi-
nals, called in the following as Alice and Bob, commit a crime together and are arrested. As the
evidence is being investigated, they wait for their trial, b) Each suspect is offered the opportunity
to confess the crime after placing him/her in a separate cell, c) Each suspect may choose between
the strategies of confessing (D) or not confessing (C), where C and D represent the pure strategies
of cooperation and defection with one’s partner in the crime and not with the authorities, d) If
neither of the two confesses, i.e. (C, C), they both go free, and divide between them the proceeds
of their crime. We represent this in the following by 3 units of payoff to each prisoner, e) How-
ever, if one prisoner confesses (D) and the other does not (C), the prisoner who confesses testifies
against his partner in exchange for going free and gets the entire 5 units of payoff. However, the
prisoner who did not confess is sent to prison and that is represented by the payoff of zero, f) If
both suspects confess, i.e. (D,D), then both are convicted while a reduced term is given to both.
This is represented by giving each suspect 1 unit of payoff. This payoff is better than having the
other suspect confess, but it is not so good as going free. The game between the prisoners can be
represented by the following bimatrix of payoffs:
Alice
C
D
Bob
C D(
(3, 3) (0, 5)
(5, 0) (1, 1)
)
(5)
where the first and the second entry in a bracket correspond to Alice’s and Bob’s payoff, respec-
tively. Let Alice play C with probability p and play D with probability (1− p). Similarly, let Bob
play C with probability q and play D with probability (1 − q). The players’ payoffs for the PD
matrix (5) are
UA(p, q) = −p+ 4q − pq + 1, UB(p, q) = 4p− q − pq + 1. (6)
The inequalities that define the NE consisting of a pair of mixed strategies (p∗, q∗) in PD can then
be written as
UA(p
∗, q∗)− UA(p, q
∗) = −(p∗ − p)(1 + q∗) ≥ 0,
UB(p
∗, q∗)− UB(p
∗, q) = −(q∗ − q)(1 + p∗) ≥ 0, (7)
which produces a unique NE in PD: p∗ = q∗ = 0. The NE corresponds to both players playing the
pure strategy D. Ref. [42] Utilizes an international relations PD game to present an explanation
of the complexities of cyber intrusions and the way forward for nation-states to deal with these
new exigencies. The PD game is also discussed in the context of cybersecurity in Ref. [54].
2.2.3 Refinements of Nash equilibrium
Some of the largest problems in security applications come from actions that cannot be anticipated.
This makes using NE problematic as the concept presumes that the structure of the game, as well
as all possible moves, is common knowledge among the players. Several refinements of the NE
have been introduced [8, 12] including sequential equilibrium, proper equilibrium, trembling hand
equilibrium, and rationalizability.
2.3 Sequential or Stackelberg games
A dynamic model of the duopoly game was proposed by Stackelberg (1934) [11, 45] in which
a leader (or dominant) firm moves first and in view of the leading firm’s move a follower (or
subordinate) firm moves second. For instance, in the early history of US mobile industry, General
Motors played this leadership role against more than one firm such as Ford and Chrysler who
acted as followers. In the sequential game of duopoly a Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained using
the solution concept of backwards-induction outcome of the game. As a solution-concept it is
stronger than that of NE and refers to sequential nature of the game. Multiple NE may appear
in sequential move games whereas only one of those is associated with the backwards-induction
outcome of the game.
Consider the following simple three step game, a) Player 1 chooses an action a1 from the set
A1 of his strategies, b) Player 2 observes a1 and then chooses an action a2 from the set A2 of her
strategies, c) Payoffs for the two players are U1(a1, a2) and U2(a1, a2). It is an example of the
dynamic games of complete and perfect information whose key features are, a) Players take their
moves in sequence, b) All previous moves are known to the players they make a next move, and c)
The players’ payoff functions are common knowledge. Given the action a1 is previously chosen, at
the second stage of the game when player 2 takes his turn to make the move he faces the problem:
Max
a2∈A2
U2(a1, a2). (8)
Assume that for each a1 in A1, player 2’s above optimization problem has a unique solution R2(a1),
which is the best response of player 2. By anticipating player 2’s response to each action a1 that
player 1 might take, Player 1 can now solve player 2’s optimization problem. So that player 1
faces the problem:
Max
a1∈A1
U1(a1, R2(a1)). (9)
Assuming that this optimization problem has a unique solution for player 1 and it is denoted by
a⋆1. The solution (a
⋆
1, R2(a
⋆
1)) is then called as the backwards-induction outcome of this game. In
Ref. [46] Damjanovic-Behrendt presents an approach to optimize the cybersecurity decisions in
order to protect instances of a federated Internet of Things platform in the cloud. His solution
implements the repeated Stackelberg security game. An overview of use-inspired research in
Stackelberg security games is presented in Ref. [47].
2.4 Repeated games
A specific class of dynamic games are the repeated games in which the players play the same
game more than once. Players observe the outcome of the first play before the start of the second
play. Payoffs for the entire game are then obtained as the sum of the payoffs from the previous
stages. Generally, repeated games have a strategic structure that is more complex than it is in
their one-stage counterpart. This is because the players’ strategic choices in the following stages
are influenced by the outcome of the choices they make in an earlier stage.
A two-stage game of complete but imperfect information is sequential in that the players’
moves in the first stage are observed before the next stage begins. The simultaneity of the players’
moves in each stage result in the imperfect information in the game. Such a game consists of these
steps [11], a) Players A and B simultaneously choose their moves p and q from their strategy
sets P and Q, respectively, b) Players A and B observe outcome of the first stage of the game,
(p, q), and they then simultaneously choose actions p1 and q1 from the sets P and Q, respectively,
c) Payoffs are Ui(p, q, p1, q1) for i = A, B. Usually, the games from this class are solved using
the method of backwards-induction. This involves solving the simultaneous-move game between
players A and B in the second stage, given the outcome from the first stage. Players A and B
can anticipate that their second-stage behavior will be given by (p⋆1(p, q), q
⋆
1(p, q)). In view of this,
the first-stage interaction between the players becomes equivalent to the following simultaneous-
move game: a) Players A and B simultaneously choose actions p and q from sets P and Q,
respectively, b) Payoffs are Ui(p, q, p
⋆
1(p, q), q
⋆
1(p, q)) for i = A,B. When (p
⋆, q⋆) is the unique NE
of this simultaneous-move game, the set of four numbers (p⋆, q⋆, p⋆1(p, q), q
⋆
1(p, q)) is known as the
subgame-perfect outcome [11] of this two-stage game. This solution concept is the natural analog
of the backwards-induction outcome in games of complete and perfect information.
Consider the PD game given by the matrix (5) for which the players play the game twice and
the outcome of the first play is observed before the second stage begins. Payoffs for the entire
game are then obtained as the sum of the payoffs from the two stages of the game. The game
is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information [11]. Assume players A and B play
the pure strategy C with probabilities p and q, respectively, in stage 1. Also assume the players
A and B play the strategy C with probabilities p1 and q1, respectively, in stage 2. Let UA1 and
UB1 represent the payoffs to players A and B, respectively, in the stage 1. From Eqs. (6) these
payoffs are UA1 = −pq+4q− p+1 and UB1 = −pq+4p− q+1. The NE conditions for this stage
are UA1(p
⋆, q⋆) − UA1(p, q
⋆) ≥ 0, UB1(p
⋆, q⋆) − UB1(p
⋆, q) ≥ 0 giving p⋆ = q⋆ = 0 (i.e. defection
for both the players) as the unique NE in this stage. Similarly, in the second stage the payoffs to
players A and B are expressed as UA2 and UB2 respectively, where UA2 = −p1q1 + 4q1 − p1 + 1,
UB2 = −p1q1 + 4p1 − q1 + 1. Therefore, the strategy of defection, i.e. p
⋆
1 = q
⋆
1 = 0, once again
comes out as the unique NE in the second stage. To compute the subgame-perfect outcome of
this two-stage game, we analyze its first stage given that the second-stage outcome is also the NE
of that stage —namely p⋆1 = q
⋆
1 = 0. For this NE the players’ payoffs in the second stage are
UA2(0, 0) = 1, UB2(0, 0) = 1. The players’ first-stage interaction, therefore, in this two-stage game
becomes equivalent to a one-shot game, in which the payoff pair (1, 1) from the second stage is
added to their first-stage payoff pair. We can write the players’ payoffs in the one-shot game as
UA(1+2) = UA1+UA2(0, 0) = −pq+4q−p+2, and UB(1+2) = UB1+UB2(0, 0) = −pq+4p− q+2.
It has again (0, 0) as the unique NE. The unique subgame-perfect outcome of the two-stage PD,
therefore, is (0, 0) in the first stage, and it is also (0, 0) in the second stage. The strategy of
defection in both the stages comes out as subgame-perfect outcome for the two stage classical PD.
2.5 Cooperative games
In cooperative games, players are allowed to form coalitions, binding agreements, pay compen-
sations, make side payments etc and there is a strong incentive to work together to receive the
largest total payoff. In their pioneering work on game theory [14], von Neumann and Morgenstern
offered models of coalition formation where the strategy of each player consists of choosing the
coalition s/he wishes to join. In coalition games the players’ possibilities are described by the
available resources of different groups (coalitions) of players and joining a group, or remaining
outside, is part of strategy of a player affecting his/her payoff. The notion of a strategy disap-
pears in a cooperative game and the notion of a coalition and the value or worth of that coalition
attain significance. It is assumed that each coalition can guarantee for its members a certain
amount that is called the value of a coalition [8, 13]. It measures the worth of the coalition that
is obtained as the payoff which the coalition can guarantee for itself if it selects an appropriate
strategy. However, the ‘odd man’ can prevent the coalition from receiving more than this amount.
An example of a three-player symmetric cooperative game is a classical three-person normal
form game [48] that is defined by:
a) Three non-empty sets ΣA, ΣB, and ΣC that are the strategy sets of the players A, B, and
C,
b) Three real valued functions UA, UB, and UC that are defined on ΣA × ΣB × ΣC , and
c) The product space ΣA × ΣB × ΣC that is the set of all tuples (σA, σB, σC) with σA ∈ ΣA,
σB ∈ ΣB and σC ∈ ΣC .
For this game, a strategy is understood as such a tuple (σA, σB, σC) and UA, UB, UC are payoff
functions of the three players and the game can be denoted as Γ = {ΣA,ΣB,ΣC ;UA, UB, UC}.
Let ℜ = {A,B,C} represent the set of players and assume that ℘ is an arbitrary subset of ℜ.
Players in ℘ may form a coalition so that the coalition ℘ can be considered as a single player. It is
expected that players in (ℜ − ℘) will form an opposing coalition and the game has two opposing
“coalition players” i.e. ℘ and (ℜ−℘). One of the two strategies 1, 2 is chosen by each of the three
players A, B, and C. There is no payoff if the three players choose the same strategy. If the two
players choose the same strategy, both receive one unit of money from the ’odd man.’ The payoff
functions UA, UB and UC for players A, B and C, respectively, are given as [48]:
UA(1, 1, 1) = UA(2, 2, 2) = 0,
UA(1, 1, 2) = UA(2, 2, 1) = UA(1, 2, 1) = UA(2, 1, 2) = 1,
UA(1, 2, 2) = UA(2, 1, 1) = −2, (10)
with similar expressions for UB and UC . Suppose ℘ = {B,C}, hence ℜ− ℘ = {A}. The coalition
game represented by Γ℘ is given by the payoff matrix:
[11]
[12]
[21]
[22]
[1] [2]

0 2
−1 −1
−1 −1
2 0

. (11)
Here the strategies [12] and [21] are dominated by [11] and [22]. After eliminating these dominated
strategies the payoff matrix becomes
[11]
[22]
[1] [2](
0 2
2 0
)
. (12)
It is seen that the mixed strategies:
1
2
[11] +
1
2
[22] , and
1
2
[1] +
1
2
[2] , (13)
are optimal for ℘ and (ℜ−℘) respectively. With these strategies a payoff 1 for players ℘ is assured
for all strategies of the opponent; hence, the value of the coalition υ(Γ℘) is 1 i.e. υ({B,C}) = 1.
Since Γ is a zero-sum game υ(Γ℘) can also be used to find υ(Γℜ−℘) as υ({A}) = −1. The game
is symmetric and one can write
υ(Γ℘) = 1, and υ(Γℜ−℘) = −1 or,
υ({A}) = υ({B}) = υ({C}) = −1,
υ({A,B}) = υ({B,C}) = υ({C,A}) = 1. (14)
Cooperative game theory has been applied to cybersecurity in a number of studies: In a Masters
thesis submitted to the Florida Atlantic University, Golchubian [56] has used cooperative game
theory by developing a game theoretical approach to prevent collusion and to incentivize cooper-
ation in cybersecurity contexts. Vakilinia and Sengupta [57] have investigated profit sharing in
coalitional game theory using calculation for rewarding the players that is participation-fee. In
particular, they analyze the well-known Shapley value concept [10,11] by formulating a coalitional
game between organizations in cybersecurity information sharing system.
2.6 Bayesian games
In other situations that are characterized by the players’ access to only a partial knowledge about
the game, game theory is still shown to be an effective modelling tool by exploiting the concepts
from Bayesian games [11]. A Bayesian game is defined as a game of incomplete information in
which the players do not have the complete knowledge of the rules of the game. The incomplete
knowledge is described by the existence of the so-called state of Nature, which is decided proba-
bilistically by some relevant random source. In Bayesian games, the probability distribution over
the states of Nature is private to each player and which represents each player’s knowledge about
Nature. Nature is allowed to leak some information about its state in the Bayesian games, which
is called the signal to the players. With the signal, the players can probabilistically work out their
expected utilities. A Bayesian game [55] consists of a tuple
〈
N,Ω, 〈Si, Ti, Ci, τ i, pi, Ui〉i∈N
〉
where
Ω is the set of natural states, and for each player i ∈ N,
a) Si is the set of player i’s all available actions,
b) Ti is the set of player i’s signals/types, with τ i : Ω −→ Ti is the state-to-signal mapping,
c) Ci : Ti −→ 2
Si is the set of i’s available actions after receiving ti ∈ Ti,
d) pi is the probability measure over Ω, and,
e) Ui : Ω× S −→ R is player i’s utility function where R is the set of real numbers.
The solution concept of a NE is adapted into Bayesian games and is called Bayesian NE. Some
applications of Bayesian games include Liu et al’s. [58] computation of Bayesian Nash outcomes for
an intrusion detection game and under the conditions of limited information, Johnson et al’s [59]
determination of Bayesian Nash equilibria for network security games.
3 Network/cybersecurity and game theory
The information technology landscape has been revolutionized by the recent advances in software
and hardware technologies. Cyberspace has now become an integral part of the way the business is
conducted. For current telecommunication and information networks, their network/cybersecurity
is the main concern and the protection and security of cyberspace infrastructure is of key impor-
tance.
Game theory is applied to networks in settings in which agents are connected by physical or
virtual links. Given the network structure and the actions of other users of the network, the agents
must decide on some action in a strategic manner.
Heterogeneous, large-scale, and dynamic networks define the cyberspace of the present time.
Cyberspace has become increasingly complex even within carefully designed network and software
infrastructures. Ample and a large attack surface is available for evasive maneuvers of adversaries
in the cyberspace. Cyberspace has become characterized by higher computational power and
ubiquitous connectivity and these features have given birth to new risks and threats.
The miscreants launching cybersecurity attacks have various degrees of uncertainty and defend-
ers have incomplete information about their intentions and capabilities. Improving cybersecurity
thus involves difficult challenges and decision making on multiple levels and over different time
scales. The goal of cybersecurity is to provide practical and scalable security mechanisms and to
enhance the trustworthiness of cyber-physical systems.
As is the case with the physical security, in cybersecurity there exists a wide variety of the
agents’ utilities, including adversarial and antithetical types. Game theory, therefore, shares
many common features with the cybersecurity problem. The success of a cybersecurity scheme
depends not only on the actual cyberdefense strategies that have been implemented, but also
on the strategic actions taken by the attackers to launch their attacks. Thus these scenarios
are well-suited to the game theoretical analyses of the cybersecurity schemes. Such analyses
can also be viewed from the perspective of establishing trust. When security is compromised,
building trustworthy relationships, and deciding whether to trust received information becomes
particularly relevant. It is well known [60] that the trust problem can be formulated as in game-
theoretic strategic terms. Trust emerges as an important aspect in the design and analysis of
security solutions and the implementations of security games involve several levels of trust.
3.1 Network/cybersecurity games
A significant motivation for cybersecurity games comes from earlier applications of game theory
to the domain of physical security. These are examples of practical situations that demonstrate
the potential for game theory in that domain. Physical security considerations are important at
airports, product transportation, national security patrols, etc. Usually, a defender allocates the
available resources to defend against an attacker whereas the attacker can attempt to compromise
targets that the defender is protecting from possible attacks. Most often, the defender can best
allocate resources to minimize the chance of success for the attacker and minimize the cost incurred
by the defender. How should the defender allocate agents, patrols, surveillance technology, and
other resources to minimize the impact of attackers? Examples of physical security situations
include, a) the airport security: where the defender can schedule optimal checkpoints and patrols
for their agents, b) the coast guard: more efficiently protection can be provided to ferries or ports
that are the targets for theft or terrorism. The finite number of agents and limited resources can
be allocated in such ways to best counteract wide scale poaching.
In network/cybersecurity situations, the zero-sum games between malicious attackers and the
transmitter-receiver pairs can model the problems of jamming and eavesdropping in communica-
tion networks. Attackers and defenders are most often considered as the agents in network security
problems. Security games form a basis for formal decision making, algorithm development, and
in predicting the behaviour of attackers. Security games can be deterministic or stochastic. They
can be sequential or hierarchical (Stackelberg game) in which an agent has a certain information
advantage over the others. In cooperative or coalitional security games the agents can cooperate
to achieve their strategic objectives. Examples of security games in the network/cybersecurity
domain include, i) intrusion detection [5, 75], ii) privacy concerns [74, 83, 84], iii) network jam-
ming [76, 77, 79], and iv) eavesdropping in communication networks [78].
Scheduling and deployment of patrols is a key operational problem for those who are responsible
for the security of airports, art galleries etc. Alpern et al. [49] have presented a class of patrolling
games addressing the optimization problem involving randomized, and thus unpredictable, patrols.
They have considered the facility to be patrolled as a network or graph Q of interconnected nodes
(e.g. rooms, terminals) such that the Attacker has the option to attack any node of Q within a
given time T. That is, the attacker requires m consecutive periods that are uninterrupted by the
Patroller in order to commit his nefarious act and therefore win. In this approach, the Patroller
can follow any path on the graph. The patrolling game turns out to be a win-lose game in which,
given best play on both sides, the Value is the probability that the Patroller successfully intercepts
an attack.
3.2 Examples
We begin by reviewing two examples from the literature in some detail, as reported by Sokri [50]
and Durkota et al [65].
3.2.1 Optimal resource allocation in cybersecurity
Sokri [50] has considered a security game between an attacker a and a defender d in a system
for cyberinfrastructure. Let T = {t1, t2, ..., tn} be a set of n targets that are at the risk of being
attacked and S = {s1, s2, ..., sm} a set of resources to protect the targets. Vector 〈at〉 can represent
the attacker’s mixed strategy where at is the probability of attacking the target t. The defender’s
mixed strategy is the vector 〈pt〉 where the marginal probability of protecting the target t is pt.
Players’ access to mixed strategies allows them to play probability distributions over their pure
strategies. A strategy profile 〈a, p〉 is a combination of (mixed) strategies that the attacker and
the defender may play. Let rd(t) be the defender’s reward if the attacked target t is covered and
cd(t) his cost if the target is uncovered. Similarly, denote by ra(t) the attacker’s reward if the
attacked target t is uncovered and by ca(t) the attacker’s costs if the attacked target t is covered.
For the strategy profile 〈a, p〉 following are the expected payoffs of the two players:
Ud(a, p) =
∑
t∈T
at [ptrd(t)− (1− pt)cd(t)] , (15)
Ua(a, p) =
∑
t∈T
at [(1 − pt)ra(t)− ptca(t)] . (16)
The payoffs in Eqs. (15,16) depend only on the attacked targets and their protection and these
payoffs do not consider the targets that are not attacked. Now, if the players move simultaneously,
the solution of this cybersecurity game is a NE. However, if the game is played sequentially in
which the defender moves first (leader) and commits to a strategy and the attacker (follower)
reacts to the defender’s move, the Stackelberg equilibrium appears as the standard solution in this
leader-follower interaction.
Given the defender’s strategy p, the attacker’s optimization problem can be presented as
follows:
Maxa
∑
t∈T
at [(1− pt)ra(t)− ptca(t)] , (17)
s. t.
∑
t∈T
at = 1, at ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T. (18)
It is optimal to assign 1 to any at that is associated with a maximal value of
Ua(t, p) = (1− pt)ra(t)− ptca(t), ∀t ∈ T. (19)
The dual problem that corresponds to the above has the same optimal solution and it can be
formulated as follows:
Min u, (20)
u ≥ Ua(t, p), ∀t ∈ T. (21)
The complementary slackness condition then becomes:
at(u − Ua(t, p)) = 0, ∀t ∈ T. (22)
When the leader problem is completed by including the follower’s optimality condition, it becomes
a single mixed-integer quadratic problem [51]:
Maxp
∑
t∈T
at [ptrd(t)− (1 − pt)cd(t)] , (23)
∑
t∈T
pt ≤ m, (24)
∑
t∈T
at = 1, (25)
0 ≤ u− Ua(t, p) ≤ (1− at)M, ∀t ∈ T, (26)
pt ∈ [0, 1], ∀t ∈ T, (27)
at ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T, (28)
u ∈ R. (29)
Eq. (23) maximizes the leader’s expected payoff. The coverage to the available resources (m) is
limited by Eq. (24) whereas Eq. (27) restricts the coverage vector to [0, 1]. The leader’s mixed
strategy is enforced to be feasible by these two constraints. Eq. (26), where M is a large number,
is the complementary slackness condition indicating that the follower’s payoff u is optimal for
every pure strategy with at > 0.
Sokri [50] has considered the example of a game in normal form as shown in the Table 1 and
that is adapted from the Refs. [52, 53]. There are 4 targets and two resources that can cover any
of the two targets. For each target, there are two payoffs i.e. the payoffs of the attacker and the
payoffs of the defender. Each payoff consists of two parts i.e. a reward and a cost.
Defender Attacker
Reward Cost Reward Cost
Target 1 4 3 9 6
Target 2 3 2 7 6
Target 3 6 4 10 8
Target 4 3 2 12 6
Table 1: Payoff table [50].
Note that, a) If the target is attacked, the defender can cover a target and get a reward, b) He
can also leave the target uncovered and incur a cost if it is attacked, c) If the target is uncovered,
the attacker can attack a target and get a reward, and d) If the target is covered he can also incur
a cost. By changing the static values in Table 1 to a range of values, an uncertainty can be placed
on each variable. Using a three-point estimate (minimum, most likely, and maximum) approach
that incorporates this uncertainty, Sokri [50] has determined the following solution, which is found
to satisfy all the constraints as well as the numerical convergence criterion:
〈p = (0.5549, 0.4994, 0.3411, 0.6025), a = (0, 0, 0, 1)〉 . (30)
The objective did not move significantly after many iterations, and even if it is heavily defended
the attacker preferred to attack the most valuable target. The most likely payoffs have the
corresponding cumulative distribution function (CDF). This can now be determined With this
solution and the median of the defender’s average payoff comes out to be approximately 0.95.
This gives a 50% probability that the defender’s average payoff will be less than 0.95. The values
for minimum and maximum of defender’s average payoff are then determined to be 0.4261 and
1.5166, respectively.
3.2.2 Threshold-setting to detect data exfiltration
Data breach involves strategic interaction between defender and attacker for which game theory
provides helpful insights. It is carried out through the process of information exfiltration and
involves unauthorized transfer of information. A dynamic (sequential) game model of data infil-
tration is described by Durkota et al [65] in which the attacker’s objective is to exfiltrate as much
data as possible before the activity is detected. The defender’s objective is to minimize the loss
of data before the breach is detected.
The defender records the volume of data that each host at the network uploads over time while
using windows of time with fixed lengths. Defender selects a detection threshold θ, chosen from a
set Θ of thresholds, such that if the host uploading data that is more than θ in the time window
then it triggers an alarm.
The defender can set the detection threshold θ for each host individually. However, it is possible
to identify groups of hosts with similar behaviours. For instance, a group can be of type λ from
the set Λ of all types. For a randomly selected host, P (λ) then defines the probability that the
host is of the type λ. That is, P (λ) is the probability of the concurrence of the host types. It is
assumed that both the attacker and the defender know the probability P (λ). Two hosts of same
types have the common activity pattern i.e. P (o | λ) gives the probability that a host of type λ
transfers the amount of data o ∈ O in a time interval.
It can be the case that even without an attacker’s activity a selected threshold θ is surpassed
along with the alarm triggered. These instances are called the false positives and usually it is
a time consuming task for the administrators to determine their cause. Certain number of false
positives are expected in the defender’s strategies and usually their bound is expressed as the
constant FP.
The external and internal attackers are called the outsider and the insider, respectively. The
nature of information that the insiders and the outsiders have about the targeted organization can
be different from each other. Although the outsider may know which host types exist but cannot
know which types were compromised. In contrast, the insider knows which host types exist and
also which were compromised.
Defender’s Strategy: Defender’s pure strategy ψ is a map from the set Λ of all types to the
set Θ of thresholds, i.e. ψ : Λ → Θ. Defender’s mixed or randomized strategy is σ(θ | λ) that
defines a probability distribution of thresholds θ given host types λ. The false positive constraint
for a defender strategy σ is then written as
∑
λ∈Λ
∑
θ∈Θ
σ(θ | λ)P (λ)FP(θ | λ) ≤ FP, (31)
where
FP(θ | λ) =
∑
o∈O: o>θ
P (o | λ), (32)
is type λ’s amount of false positives when the threshold is θ.
Attacker’s Strategy: It consists of choosing the amount of data a ∈ A that the attacker
infiltrates in the next time window. By controlling one of the users, the attacker uploads as much
data as possible before being detected. The attacker is awarded a utility when the sum of the
host’s activity o ∈ O and the amount of data that the attacker infiltrates a ∈ A is less than the
detection threshold θ ∈ Θ. A belief state
b ∈ ∆(Λ×Θ) (33)
is a probability distribution over possible host types and threshold settings. It is assumed that
first the defender selects the threshold θ and the attacker acts in response to knowing θ. Attacker’s
expected utility is then defined as ua(σ, pi) where σ is the defender’s mixed strategy whereas pi is
the attacker’s policy chosen from the set Π. The attacker’s policy
pi : ∆(Λ×Θ)→ A, (34)
is defined as a mapping from the set of belief states ∆(Λ×Θ) to the set A of the amounts of data.
During the course of interaction with the defender, the attacker takes into account the last action
and observation and uses Bayesian update rule in order to keep track of his belief b. Attacker’s
action pi depends on his belief b i.e. pi = pi(b). The defender’s expected utility is defined as
ud(σ, pi) = −Cua(σ, pi), (35)
where C > 0. This requires that the attacker and the defender have opposite objectives and their
payoffs are proportional to each other’s. Also, C being greater than 1 means that the defender’s
disutility is greater than the attacker’s utility.
The insider vs. outsider attacks: The data breach attacks can be performed by agents
who are inside an organization/company or who are inside. The outsiders usually does not know
the type of the host that is compromised even though s/he can know which types (group) exist
within the company, for instance, IT admins and secretaries. The insiders, however, know their
host types as they use the network regularly and they are also knowledgeable on the defences
that are deployed. For instance, an insider because of him/her knowing the exact values of the
thresholds that has been fixed for each host type by the defender, can exfiltrate exactly at those
values.
An approximate algorithm is used to compute the attacker’s policy and to find an approximate
Stackelberg equilibrium. The defender’s strategy is also an approximate Stackelberg equilibrium
and his utility presents as a close approximation to the exact Stackelberg equilibrium.
Defender’s optimal strategy against attacks by the insiders: Durkota et al [65] present
an algorithm that computes exact Stackelberg algorithm against attacks from the insiders. Know-
ing the type of the user, using whom the insider can exfiltrate data, allows representing the game
between the host and the attacker as a normal form game. For this game, the attacker’s strategy
consists of choosing for each host type a probability distribution over the actions from the set A.
Similarly, the defender’s strategy consists of choosing for each host type a probability distribu-
tion over thresholds from the set Θ. The game between the attacker and all host types can then
be formalized as one problem. To achieve this, the zero-sum normal-form linear program [66] is
extended to include a false-positive constraint and multiple host types:
min
σ(θ|λ)
Ua, (36)
s.t. : (∀λ ∈ Λ, ∀a ∈ A) :
∑
θ∈Θ
ua(θ, a, λ)σ(θ | λ) ≤ Ua,λ, (37)
∑
λ∈Λ
P (λ)Ua,λ ≤ Ua, (38)
(∀λ ∈ Λ) :
∑
λ∈Λ
σ(θ | λ) = 1, (39)
(∀λ ∈ Λ, ∀a ∈ A) : σ(θ | λ) ≥ 0, (40)∑
λ∈Λ
∑
θ∈Θ
P (λ)σ(θ | λ)FP(θ | λ) ≤ FP. (41)
Here σ(θ | λ), Ua and Ua,λ are the variables in the linear program. In the above, the expected
utilities of each type are Ua,λ that is weighed by its probability given by (38). With the require-
ment (36), the expected utility of the attacker Ua is minimized. With the requirement (37) it is
ensured that against the given defense strategy, a best response is played in each host type. The
requirements given by (39) and (40) are placed in order to ensure that the defender’s strategy
given by σ is considered a proper probability distribution. The requirement (41) ensures that the
false-positive rate is met by σ.
Defender’s optimal strategy against attacks by the outsiders: As the outsider is
unaware of the host’s type, s/he tries to learn about it by observing host’s activity. This results
in the attacker’s strategies becoming more complex when these are compared to the strategies of
the insider. To achieve his objectives, the outsider can come up with stronger attacks which can
vary over time. The uncertainty involved suggests using Partially Observable Markov Decisions
Processes (POMDPs). The algorithms developed in order to solve POMDPs can be used to
compute the attacker’s best response and his/her optimal strategy. In every time step, the attacker
exploiting the POMDP framework takes an action from a set of allowed actions and receives the
environment’s response to that action. Based on this response he then updates his beliefs about
the environment. Also, in each time step, the attacker’s utility is a function of his action and the
environment’s response. POMDP generates a solution in the form of a policy describing the list of
actions for all belief states about the environment. Heuristic Search Value Iteration (HSVI) [67] is
the well established algorithm that is used to solve the POMDPs as it computes the Stackelberg
equilibrium of the game. Using interations the HSVI computes the strategies constituting the best
response of the attacker and the defender. A best response is then achieved by a convergence of
the best response strategies.
4 Application scenarios
Game theory has many security applications, and we cannot give detailed examples of all such
analyses here. In this section, we review a number of other applications that have seen game-
theoretic analysis.
4.1 Trust assignment
Rajtmajer et al. (2017) [83] consider the problem of multiparty access control [68]. Users of social
networks have a shared interest in the privacy settings applied to content relating to them. They
model the problem as a variant of the ultimatum game where all parties are motivated to reach
some agreement, despite the need to compromise. They develop a model of how participants will
vary their offers over time, and show empirically that the network tends to converge around the
proposals of the more ‘stubborn’ users who are unwilling to vary their proposals. However, they
also find that stubborn users are less likely to reach agreement with their neighbours at all, unlike
less stubborn users who will quickly take an approach similar to that of their neighbours, resulting
in a greater rate of successful interaction.
Raya et al. (2010) [84] consider the “free-rider” problem in systems based on data aggregation:
participants gain a privacy benefit by refusing to trust other parties with their data, but with less
data available, the system as a whole becomes less resistant to malicious behavior. They show
that it is possible to design an incentive scheme that discourages free-riding to avoid a ‘tragedy of
the commons’-type scenario.
4.2 Resource allocation
Game theory is a natural tool for the analysis of resource allocation problems in cybersecurity. An
example of this is the analysis by Panaousis et al. (2014) [73], which builds up a quantitative model
of how various security controls interact with various classes of vulnerability, yielding different
types of costs to the defender, for example in the form of reputational damage or data loss. This
is then used to argue that certain controls are or are not worthwhile at a given budget and at a
given depth in the network.
A related analysis is given by Cui et al. (2017) [69]. In [69], it is hypothesized that an attacker
can choose between attacking a customer database and attacking individual users. Gaining access
to the database yields a greater reward for the attacker, but may lead to a more vigorous law-
enforcement response. Conversely, targeting individual users—e.g. by phishing—leads to a reduced
payoff, but may be less risky for the attacker. The defender is represented by two parties: a system
administrator who manages the database, and a user who sets a security level for themselves only.
One of the more interesting features of this model is the use of a two-stage process for compromising
the database, in order to model the greater technical sophistication of such an attack, at least
relative to the difficulty of acquiring user credentials by e.g. phishing.
4.3 Anomaly detection
Intrusion detection systems based on anomaly detection [70] require the setting of a threshold
parameter, that determines whether some data is reported as ‘normal’ or ‘anomalous’. This leads
to a trade-off: a low threshold will force attackers to sacrifice the efficacy of their attacks in
order to stay covert, but will also lead to a high false-positive rate, resulting in excess cost to the
defender. Conversely, a high threshold will reduce the time wasted investigating false-positives,
but allows attackers to be less covert and use more powerful attacks that are more costly to the
defender.
This interplay between the strategies of the attacker and defender is well-modelled by game-
theory, and so game-theoretic methods can effectively inform the design of these anomaly detectors.
Schlenker [63] considers the problem of allocating investigative resources to security-relevant
events in a more general sense. A system that triggers investigation in too-predictable a manner
is vulnerable to an attacker that can tailor its behavior so as to avoid a follow-up investigation
even if it is detected. For example, a system that directs all its investigative capacity toward
targets labelled as high-value is easily circumvented by an attacker who has carte blanche to
attack moderate-value systems without concern for covertness.
4.4 Information flow
Durkota et al. (2017) [65] consider the problem of detecting data exfiltration in a heterogeneous
network. Once an attacker is present inside a network, they must decide how quickly to exfiltrate
the data that they acquire: a small flow of data is difficult to detect, but the value of the informa-
tion to the attacker is less timely and therefore argued to be less valuable. Conversely, a large flow
of data is more readily apparent, but more valuable to the adversary while it goes undetected.
This leads to an interesting result: the optimum strategy for the defender is to vary their detection
threshold randomly, yielding a 30% reduction in exfiltrated data relative to a deterministic choice
of threshold.
Alvim et al. (2017) [72] consider information leakage in more general terms, defining a frame-
work of information leakage games, and finding that in many cases, the attacker also benefits
from a mixed strategy. They also show that the utility of a strategy for the defender is a convex
function, allowing the optimal strategy to be determined using normal optimization techniques.
4.5 Deception
Others have used game theory to model techniques aimed at deception of attackers [62]. Under-
brink (2016) [61] classifies these into passive methods, which serve to frustrate reconnaissance and
detect the attacker before it strikes, and active methods, which in which the defender takes actions
predicted to interfere with an attack in progress.
Schlenker [64] considers the passive case where the defender manipulates their behavior so
that an attacker scanning the defender’s network will be uncertain about the type or value of each
system, making it difficult for the attacker to effectively allocate their effort. Schlenker shows
that determining the optimal strategy for the defender is NP-hard in general, but provides an
algorithm to approximate this.
Alternatively, deception may be used to engage an attacker that has already compromised the
defender’s network. Hora´k et al. (2017) [71] consider a system in which the defender can feed
the attacker with useless data once an attack has been detected. They argue that evicting the
attacker immediately upon detection is suboptimal, as this leads to the attacker starting again
from an ‘undetected’ state, only now armed with useful information on the defender’s detection
capabilities. The defender might therefore be better served by allowing the attacker to remain for
a time, ideally fed with a stream of valueless disinformation.
4.6 Jamming
Game-theoretic analysis of channel jamming has a long history, tracing back to Basar (1983) [79],
who shows that the optimum strategy of a single attacker seeking to jam a Gaussian memoryless
channel is to either transmit a linear function of the transmitted signal or to transmit random
symbols, depending on the relative signal and noise powers.
Other authors have carried out similar analyses in different situations: for example Kashyap et
al. (2004) [80] consider a Rayleigh fading channel, and show that knowledge of the channel input
does not affect the jammer’s strategy.
Altman et al. (2009) [77] analyze the case of multiple attackers who seek to jam an orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) communication channel. The attacker and defender must
each decide how to distribute their power across the available subchannels in order to minimize
or maximise, respectively, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the channel.
Han et al. (2009) [78] consider a different scenario in which ‘friendly’ jammers broadcast
their own signals, introducing noise to disrupt eavesdroppers. They consider the problem from an
economic viewpoint: what price can the friendly jammers demand for their services, given some
desired rate of secret communication? However, like all economic analyses, this depends strongly
on the model of the participants: their analysis assumes that the sender gains a constant utility
per unit bandwidth, and the jammers pay a constant amount per unit power. Nevertheless, the
results are interesting: in their simulations, they find that there exists a cutoff price for jamming
power above which the use of friendly jammers is no longer justifiable.
4.7 Smart grids
Smart grids can incorporate fine-grained demand-side data into their control systems, as well
as provide demand-side management: with the right incentives, users will consent to automatic
reduction of their power consumption at times of high load—for example, by slightly increasing the
target temperature of their air conditioners, or by delaying the activation of refrigerator motors.
By incorporating incentives into the pricing scheme, users may be incentivized to lie about
their usage in order to secure a reduced tariff. Mohsenian-Rad et al. (2010) [82] provide a game-
theoretic analysis of a decentralized demand-side management system; they show how to design
the system so that users do not benefit from lying to each other about their usage.
Though a decentralized system as in [82] might provide privacy benefits to its users, issues such
as communication complexity and deployment considerations may result in a centralized system
being preferable in practice. Hajj and Awad (2015) [81] describe a centralized system that uses
game-theoretic methods to provides optimum scheduling. This comes at the cost of forcing users
to reveal their projected demand to the supplier. In practice this may be a reasonable sacrifice:
in order to take advantage of off-peak tariffs, users must already reveal some information on their
demand schedule, so the difference in privacy might well be small in practice.
5 Challenges to applying game theory to security
Although game theory has been shown to be significant for security, there exist many challenges
that need to be addressed for developing a viable game-theoretic approaches to security. In this
regard, some key challenges include the complexity of computing a game-theoretical equilibrium
strategy, as the illustrative examples in Section (3.2) show. There are also difficulties in properly
quantifying security parameters such as risk, privacy, and trust [83] [84], i.e. the parameters in
terms of which the utility functions for the participants (players) in a security game are defined.
Choosing an appropriate game model for a given security problem comes out as a challenge
for the game theory too. Such a model need to depend on the detail and particular aspects of the
security problem/application scenario. Choosing a game can be solely based on the intuition and
this choice may not substantiated by the available data. A two-player game can be a model for a
security game involving an attacker and a defender. However, in the dynamic version of this game
can involve multiple stages for attacking and defending. In fact, as described in Section (3.2), the
games of later type are more likely to be representative of the network/cybersecurity challenges
of the real world.
Another aspect of the security game models is that the players are assumed to have unbounded
rationality. In real life and experimental studies, the players do not always act with rationality. As
a consequence, there exists a significant scope for studying the solution-concepts of Harsanyi’s dis-
turbed games or that of Selten’s perturbed games [13] [9] in the network/cybersecurity situations.
In Selten’s perturbed games, a player’s hand ‘trembles’, resulting in the erroneous move and the
trembles are assumed to be determined by a random process. On the other hand, in Harsanyi’s
disturbed games, it is the payoffs or the utility functions, rather than the players’ actions, that go
astray.
Interpretation of game-theoretical notions such as mixed strategy Nash equilibrium also ap-
pears as a challenge, and particularly so for the security games. Usual approach in game theory
in this regard involves considering repeated games whereas many security games are represented
as one-shot games. Even within the game theory community, there is no consensus on how to
interpret a mixed strategy. There is clear need for interpreting the notion of a mixed-strategy
for network/cybersecurity games. In order to convert the game theoretic results into practical
security solutions these challenges are required to be addressed.
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